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I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment presents a comparative description and analysis of
new developments in international agreements which will aid the SEC
in its investigations of suspicious transactions effected through foreign
financial institutions. One of the key steps in an SEC investigation of
insider trading is the determination of the identity of the investor who
made the suspicious trades.' This can be a major hurdle because of
foreign secrecy and blocking laws which prohibit the financial in-
termediaries from revealing the identity of the investor.2 These secrecy
and blocking laws are not merely impediments designed to frustrate the
SEC and attract tainted money. They are deeply rooted in history.3
1. See Fedders, Wade, Mann & Beizer, Waiver By Conduct - A Possible Re-
sponse to the Internationalization of the Securities Markets, 6 J. COMP. Bus. & CAP.
M.L. 1, 7 (1984) [hereinafter Fedders].
2. Id.
3. Boyle & Thou, The Newest Configuration of the Ugly American: A Response
to Mr. Fedders, 6 J. CoMP. Bus. & CAP. M.L. 323, 326 (1984) (stating that banking
secrecy predates the SEC) [hereinafter Boyle]; See Liftin, Our Playing Field, Our
Rules: An Analysis of the SEC's Waiver By Conduct Approach, 11 BROOKLYN J.
INT'L L. 525, 530 (1985) (discussing banking secrecy in Switzerland); See generally
Fedders, supra note 1, at 30-39 (appendices providing an overview of secrecy and
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The tradition of banking secrecy emerged in the sixteenth century with
the development of commercial banking.4 "The tradition of secrecy in
the bank-customer relationship originally emerged to protect individual
rights . . . ." In Germany, for example, banking secrecy is based on
the constitutional right to privacy.6
Another problem which the SEC has is that many people simply
do not consider insider trading to be dishonest.7 "Misuse of insider
knowledge is not commonly recognized as criminal in most European
countries."8 Indeed, prohibitions on insider trading have been attacked
by some U.S. scholars. 9 For example, it has been argued that prohibi-
tions on insider trading destroy incentives to produce socially valuable
information. 10 Another argument is that capital markets are so efficient
that any possible gains resulting from governmental regulation are out-
weighed by the costs of the regulation.1"
Foreign banks, then, often will not cooperate with SEC investiga-
tions. 1 2 Doing so may cause them to break the laws of their own coun-
blocking laws).
4. Fedders, supra note 1, at 30.
5. Id.
6. See Moessle, The Basic Structure of United States Securities Law Enforce-
ment in International Cases, 16 CAL. W.L. REV. 1, 21 (1986).
7. See Boyle, supra note 3, at 326.
8. Capitani, Response to Fedders' "Waiver by Conduct," 6 J. COMP. Bus. & CAP.
M.L. 331, 331 (1984). At the time of Capitani's writing, "Only France, Great Britain,
and Denmark ha[d] enacted penal provisions to cover trading on inside information."
Id. Since then, however, some additional countries, including Sweden, have made some
form of insider trading unlawful. The Securities Market Act (SFS 1986:313) §§ 7, 8,
20 (Sweden).
9. See Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV.
857 (1983); Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading, 44 HARV. Bus. REV. 113 (Nov.-
Dec. 1966); Scott, Insider Trading: Rule lOb-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 801 (1980).
10. Scott, supra note 9, at 812.
11. Manne, What Kind of Controls on Insider Trading Do We Need in the At-
tack on Corporate America? in THE ATTACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA 119, at 122-24
(M. Johnson ed. 1978). See also Fischel & Easterbrook, Close Corporations and
Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 273 (arguing that competition keeps anticipated
returns equal for all types of firms and that "[n]o a priori case can be made for greater
legal intervention in . . . corporations."). But see Finnerty, Insiders and Market Effi-
ciency, 31 J. FIN. 1141 (1976) (providing statistical evidence that insiders make abnor-
mal returns and refuting the strong efficient market hypothesis).
12. The SEC recently obtained the cooperation of the Swiss government for the
first time in identifying bank customers who violated U.S. securities laws. SEC v. Cer-
tain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock and Call Options for the Common
Stock of Santa Fe International Corp., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 92,484 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1986) [hereinafter Santa Fe]. Since then, the
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tries." Perhaps more importantly, cooperation with SEC investigations
might be bad for business. 4 Are there any methods of compelling for-
eign banks to provide information? It is possible, in extreme cases, to
compel the information through court orders and contempt proceed-
ings." This creates some problems in international law, however, be-
cause the court is forcing the bank to break the law of its own coun-
try."' This extraordinary method of obtaining information is not
productive in the long-run as it fosters resentment rather than coopera-
tion. " The diplomatic front appears to be the more promising route.1 8
This Comment presents some of the progress which has been made.
Part II presents the background for these accords with a review of
the facts in the case of SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the
Common Stock and Call Options for the Common Stock of Santa Fe
International Corp. (Santa Fe).N' Part III describes the negotiated ac-
cords with Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Japan, the Cayman Is-
lands, Ontario, and Canada. A comparative analysis is presented in
part IV, and conclusions are offered in part V.
II. BACKGROUND
The Santa Fe case exemplifies the problems confronting an SEC
investigation when alleged securities law violators hide behind foreign
banking secrecy laws.2 0 The SEC filed its original complaint against
unknown purchasers of Santa Fe International Corporation (Santa Fe)
stock and options on October 26, 1981 2 The SEC's complaint alleged
SEC has received Swiss governmental assistance a second time. SEC v. Katz, [1986-
1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 92,867 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 1986).
13. Liftin, supra note 3, at 550.
14. "In 1964, the Cayman Islands had only one or two banks and virtually no
registered nonresident businesses. By late 1981, the Caymans had about 330 banks and
over 13,000 registered companies." Fedders, supra note 1, at 32. This explosive growth
in the Cayman Islands banking industry has been partially attributable to the existence
of bank secrecy. Id.
15. SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana ("St. Joe case"), 92 F.R.D. 111
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
16. See Liftin, supra note 3, at 551-53.
17. See Newcomb, Policing Trans-Border Fraud: The View From the Bridge, 11
BROOKLYN J. INT'L. L. 559, 569-74 (1985) (discussing past foreign reaction to unilat-
eral efforts and heavy-handed methods employed by the U.S. to obtain information).
18. See Bschorr, "Waiver By Conduct": Another View, 6 J. Comp. Bus. & CAP.
M.L. 307, 311-13 (1984).
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that:
the Defendant Purchasers have violated the anti-fraud provisions of
the Exchange Act by effecting transactions in the common stock of,
and options to purchase the common stock of, Santa Fe while in the
possession of material nonpublic information relating to merger dis-
cussions, negotiations and proposals between Santa Fe and Kuwait
Petroleum Corp. ("KPC").22
On October 5, 1981 the merger was announced. 3 Under the
agreement Santa Fe shareholders were to receive $51 per share." Prior
to the announcement the closing share price was $24.75.2' After the
announcement the price rose to $43.75.2 The original complaint al-
leged that during the twenty-five days preceding the announcement the
defendant purchasers bought 3,000 call options on Santa Fe stock and
35,000 shares of stock. 7 The increase in value of these securities re-
sulted in a realized profit of approximately $6.2 million on a $750,000
investment.2 8 "Almost all of these purchases were made through ac-
counts maintained with Swiss banks . . .,.
The Commission had a difficult time identifying most of the de-
fendant purchasers. All but one of the defendant purchasers traded
through Swiss banks." At the time the complaint was filed, the Swiss
banks, through which the purchases were effected, refused to identify
the purchasers upon claims that Swiss bank secrecy laws prevented
them from doing so." Thereafter, the SEC, through the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, filed a request for assistance from the Swiss govern-
ment to obtain customer identifying information and other relevant evi-
dence. 2 Subsequently, the highest court in Switzerland, the Swiss
22. Santa Fe, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,323.
23. SEC Charges Santa Fe Insiders, Seeks Disgorgement of Profits, 14 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 1717 (Oct. 8, 1982).
24. Investor Losses from Insider Trading in Santa Fe Could Total $57 Million,
House Subcommittee Told, [July-Dec.] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 625 at A6-
A7 (Oct. 21, 1981).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Santa Fe, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,323.






Federal Court, blocked assistance to the SEC.33 The court considered
the case a second time, and the case "was appealed to the highest polit-
ical body in Switzerland, the Federal Council, before authorization to
disclose the requested information was finally obtained." ' , This case
represents the first time the SEC was successful in obtaining the coop-
eration of the Swiss government to identify customers who purchased
securities on the U.S. markets through Swiss banks. 35
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCORDS
A. The Swiss Memorandum of Understanding
The Swiss Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)3 6 dated Au-
gust 31, 1982, is the oldest of the U.S. agreements with foreign govern-
ments aimed at facilitating investigations of insider transactions. The
Memorandum was designed to temporarily fill a gap in the Treaty be-
tween the United States and Switzerland on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters entered into force on January 23, 1977.37 The 1977
Treaty provides for cooperation between the countries in investigations
and court proceedings involving criminal offenses.38 However, the 1977
Treaty requires that the offense be a crime under the laws of both
countries to fall within the scope of the Treaty. 9 Insider trading, how-
ever, "is not yet per se punishable under Swiss law .... -4 Address-
ing this aspect, Art. 111(1) of the Swiss MOU provides that the Swiss
Federal Council will submit a bill to Parliament criminalizing insider
trading.4' Such a law would bring the insider trading problem under
the 1977 Treaty and effectively terminate the Swiss MOU.42 To date,
33. Swiss Supreme Court Opinion Concerning Judicial Assistance in the Santa
Fe Case, 22 I.L.M. 785 (1983).
34. Santa Fe, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,484.
35. Id.
36. Switzerland-United States: Memorandum of Understanding to Establish Mu-
tually Acceptable Means for Improving International Law Enforcement Cooperation
in the Field of Insider Trading, 22 I.L.M. 1 (1983), 14 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
1737 (Oct. 8, 1982) [hereinafter Swiss MOU].
37. Id. at art. III, 1.
38. Id. at art. II, l 1.
39. Id. at art. 1I, 1 3(b).
40. Id. at art. I, T 2. In some circumstances trading on material non-public infor-
mation could be an offense under the Swiss Penal Code for fraud, unfaithful manage-
ment, or violation of business secrets. Id. at art. II, 1 3(b).
41. Id. at art. 111, 9 1.
42. The usefulness of the Swiss MOU is dependent on a private Agreement
Among Members of the Swiss Bankers' Association, 22 I.L.M. 7 (1983) [hereinafter
Agreement]. Article I of the Agreement provides that "[tihe Agreement will be abro-
1987]
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the bill criminalizing insider trading in Switzerland has not been en-
acted, and the Memorandum of Understanding is still in force. How-
ever, the bill has been passed by the upper House of the Swiss Parlia-
ment,4' and it is expected to pass in the lower House as well."
The Swiss MOU probably will be superseded soon; nevertheless, it
is worth analyzing. The Swiss MOU is the first accord of its type be-
tween the U.S. and a leading banking haven.4 5 As such, it can help
shed some light on the relative merits of various other accords.
The Swiss Memorandum of Understanding draws its strength
from a private agreement entered into by members of the Swiss Bank-
ers' Association.4 The private Agreement and the Memorandum of
Understanding impose a number of limitations on their usefulness to
SEC investigations. First of all, only trades made within twenty-five
days of a public announcement are covered. 47 Illegal trading on mate-
rial nonpublic information which occurs more than twenty-five days
prior to a public announcement is not covered, and disclosure of infor-
mation in such cases is still a violation of the Swiss banking secrecy
laws. Second, the Agreement only covers situations in which there is "a
public announcement .. .of (A) a proposed merger, consolidation,
sale of substantially all of an issuer's assets or other similar business
combination . . . or (B) the proposed acquisition of at least 10% of the
securities of an issuer by open market purchase, tender offer or other-
wise ... "48 Information pertaining to illegal trading on the basis of
dividend announcements or the discovery of valuable resources, for ex-
ample, would still be protected from disclosure by Swiss bank secrecy
law.49 Third, the Agreement adopts an arguably narrow definition of an
gated in the case of the Swiss legislature enacting legislation on the misuse of inside
information." The Swiss MOU in turn, provides that "[alt the termination of the pri-
vate Agreement, the parties will consult regarding . . .the effect of such termination
on this memorandum." Swiss MOU at art. IV, I 2(b).
43. Upper Half Of Swiss Parliament Approves Insider Trading Bill, 18 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 1481 (October 10, 1986).
44. Swiss Government Publishes Draft Law Making Insider Trading Criminal
Offense, 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 797 (May 3, 1985).
45. See Newcomb, supra note 17, at 575.
46. See supra note 42
47. Agreement at art. I.
48. id.
49. An example of an actual case in which U.S. securities laws were violated, but
for which no assistance would be available under the Agreement is SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 312 F.Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971) (in
which insiders who traded or tipped others who traded on nonpublic information re-
garding the discovery of valuable minerals were required to disgorge profits).
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insider.8 0 Low level employees who might be insiders under U.S. law
are excluded, and temporary insiders who might be liable under a mis-
appropriation or quasi-insider theory might be excluded. 51 The determi-
nation of insider status is within the complete discretion of the commis-
sion set up by the Swiss Bankers' Association and is critical because no
information will be disclosed if it is determined that the person effect-
ing the trade is not an insider. 2 A fourth limitation is that the Swiss
Federal Office for Police Matters may block disclosure of information
to the SEC if it determines that such disclosure would cause considera-
ble harm to national interests or innocent third parties."
50. An insider is defined as:
a) a member of the board, an officer, an auditor or a mandated person of the
Company or an assistant of any of them;
b) a member of a public authority or a public officer who in the execution of his
public duty received information about an Acquisition or a Business Combination
or
c) a person who on the basis of information about an Acquisition or a Business
Combination received from a person described in 2. a) or b) above has been able
to act for the latter or to benefit himself from inside information.
Agreement at art. V, 2. At least one commentator has opined that this definition
might be interpreted to exclude persons who might be insiders under U.S. law. Note,
Insider Trading Laws and Swiss Banks: Recent Hope for Reconciliation, 22 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 303, 315-26 (1984). Examples of people who might be excluded are
employees who are not members of the board, officers, or an assistant to any of them,
and employees of contractors who discover information on their own, but are not
deemed to be mandated persons of the company.
On the other hand, part (c) of the definition extends liability to tippees more
broadly than U.S. law. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646
(1983), that tippees are liable only when the tippers have breached a fiduciary duty
and the tippee knew or should have known of the breach. Cf. SEC v. Switzer, 590 F.
Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (holding person who traded on information overheard at
a track meet not liable). Part (c) does not impose this requirement.
51. An example of an actual case in which U.S. securities laws were violated, but
for which assistance might not be available because of the Swiss definition of an insider
is Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974) (in which underwriters with
nonpublic information regarding corporate earnings tipped customers). The argument
would be that the specific tippers were employees of the underwriting company and not
persons mandated by the company whose securities were traded. But see SEC v. Katz,
[1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,991 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14,
1986) (in which assistance was rendered under the Swiss MOU when financial analyst
who was an employee of underwriting firm tipped others). Note that no information
would be forthcoming in any event under the facts of Shapiro since the Agreement
does not cover the type of information involved.
52. Swiss MOU at art. III, 1 3.
53. Swiss MOU at art. III, V 3. A provision permitting the blocking of informa-
tion when in the public interest is standard in these accords; however, the Swiss MOU
is unusual in that it prohibits disclosure when innocent third parties might be harmed.
1987]
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The procedure provided for in the Agreement is for the U.S. De-
partment of Justice to make a written request to the Swiss Federal
Office for Police Matters in connection with a formal investigation of a
possible violation of insider trading laws.54 The request must specifi-
cally identify the transactions under investigation, must be accompa-
nied by documentation, and must agree to provide all evidence or sum-
maries of evidence in the SEC's possession which is relevant and
nonprivileged. 55 The request must also agree that the SEC will not dis-
close any of the information received except in connection with an SEC
investigation or law enforcement action initiated by the SEC for viola-
tions of insider trading laws. 6 The request is then turned over to a
"Commission of Inquiry" whose members are appointed by the Board
of Directors of the Swiss Bankers' Association.57
The SEC must establish to the reasonable satisfaction of the Com-
mission that it has a reasonable basis to make the inquiry. 58 Addressing
this aspect, the Agreement sets a threshold which constitutes an ir-
rebuttable presumption of a reasonable basis.59 The threshold is crossed
when either: (i) the daily trading volume of the securities increased at
any time during the twenty-five trading day period prior to the public
announcement by 50% or more over the average daily volume of the
period during the 90th trading day to the 30th trading day prior to the
announcement; or (ii) the price of the securities fluctuates at least 50%
or more during the twenty-five day period prior to the announcement.6
When the irrebuttable presumption is not brought into play, the deter-
mination as to whether a reasonable basis for the inquiry exists is en-
tirely within the discretion of the Commission set up by the Swiss
Bankers' Association.6' The Commission is to use a standard of "rea-
sonable satisfaction.""2
If the Commission is reasonably satisfied that the SEC has
grounds for an inquiry provided for in the Agreement it shall call for a
54. Agreement at art. I.
55. Id. at art. III, 7 2-3.
56. Id. at art. III, 5.
57. Id. at art. II, 1. The Commission is "composed of three members and three
deputies. Neither the members of the Commission nor their deputies may exercise an
executive function in a company which is subject to the Federal Law on Banks and
Savings Banks." Id.
58. Id. at art. III, I 4.
59. Swiss MOU at art. III, I 3.
60. Agreement at art. III, I 4.
61. Swiss MOU at art. III, I 3; Agreement at art. IV, I 1.
62. Swiss MOU at art. III, I 3.
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report from the banks involved in the transactions." At this point, a
subject bank is required to inform the customer of the investigation."
The customer is not obligated to respond.6 5 If the customer wishes to
provide evidence and information for the Commission's report, he may
do so within 30 days.66 In any case, the bank is to file a report with the
Commission within 45 days of receipt of the inquiry providing: (i) the
customer's name, address, and nationality; (ii) all details of the cus-
tomer's trading in the securities and options of the company within 40
days of the announcement; and (iii) all materials received from the
customer.
7
The Commission then forwards a report to the Federal Office for
Police Matters which is to be forwarded to the SEC unless the Com-
mission determines that (i) the customer did not make any of the trans-
actions identified in the inquiry; or (ii) the customer is not an insider
within the terms of the agreement.6 8 There is no provision enabling the
SEC to appeal such a determination. As mentioned previously, the
Federal Office for Police Matters can withhold the report from the
SEC if it would materially harm national interests or innocent third
parties.69
The bank is required to block the customer's account to the extent
of the profit or avoided loss upon the Commission's command.7 0 In this
regard, the Agreement provides that "[tlhe amounts blocked shall be
held by the bank pending disposition of the matter by the SEC or U.S.
courts. ' 71 The terms of the MOU imply that the Commission will in-
struct the bank to block the customer's account whenever a proper re-
quest has been made which reasonably satisfies the Commission that
the SEC has grounds for an inquiry under the Agreement." If the ac-
count is blocked, the bank will remit to the SEC a sum up to the un-
lawful profit plus accrued interest once a final judgement is entered in
63. Agreement at art. IV, 1.
64. Id. at art. IV, 2.
65. Swiss MOU at art. III, 3.
66. Agreement at art IV, 1.
67. Id. at art. IV, 1 3-4.
68. Id. at art. V.
69. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
70. Agreement at art. 9, 1 1.
71. Id.
72. The actual wording of the MOU is, "If the criteria of Article 1 a) [that a
formal request for assistance has been made] and Article 3 [essentially that the Com-
mission is reasonably satisfied that the request is proper] are fulfilled, the bank, at the
Commission's notice shall immediately block the customer's account . . . ." Id.
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a U.S. court against the customer or the customer consents in writing. 3
The MOU suggests that in return for the cooperation of the Swiss
government and the Swiss Bankers' Association, the SEC will not em-
ploy unilateral and heavy-handed tactics."' The precise phrasing of this
delicate suggestion is :
If the Commission of [I]nquiry arrives at the conclusion that a cli-
ent is not an insider as defined by the private Agreement, the SEC
will judge this opinion as one made in good faith, use moderation
and take into account the existence of this memorandum when con-
sidering alternative measures.~
The procedures of the Swiss MOU were successfully used in the
case of SEC v. Katz.76 Katz was an analyst with an investment banking
firm who obtained material, nonpublic information relating to a merger
between RCA and General Electric.7 7 Katz tipped several people in-
cluding one Mordo who purchased 100,000 shares of RCA through a
Swiss bank.76 The Swiss MOU was utilized to obtain evidence against
Mordo which resulted in his consenting to disgorge $1,087,532.7' The
request was reviewed and affirmed by the Swiss Bankers' Association,
the Swiss Supreme Court, and the Swiss Federal Council. 80 The profits
which Mordo disgorged were frozen in a Swiss bank during these
deliberations. 81
B. U.K. Memorandum of Understanding
The Memorandum of Understanding between the U.K. and the
U.S. was entered into September 23, 1986.82 This agreement is consid-
erably less limited than that with the Swiss. The memorandum applies
to any SEC or Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in-
73. Id. at art. 9, 2.
74. Cf. Swiss MOU at art. II, 3.
75. id.







82. Memorandum of Understanding on Exchange of Information Between the
SEC, CFTC, and the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry in Matters
Relating to Securities and Futures, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,027 (Sept. 23, 1986) [hereinafter U.K. MOU].
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vestigation into a possible violation of a U.S. statute or rule relating to
the prevention of insider dealing or market manipulation.8" Therefore,
unlike the Swiss agreement, it is not restricted to insider trading within
twenty-five days of a public announcement of an acquisition or business
combination. Additionally, U.S. law would control the determination of
whether an individual is an insider. The major limitation is that a re-
quest must be reasonably related to securing compliance with the legal
rule or requirement which is believed to have been violated.84
The procedure provided for requires that a written request be
made with the British Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) except
that in urgent cases the request can be oral, providing written confir-
mation is made within ten days.8" The request must indicate the pur-
pose for which the information is desired and the grounds which make
the request reasonably related to compliance with the law. 86 Attending
to this issue, the U.K. MOU states that if the DTI is not satisfied that
the request is reasonable and fully complies with the Memorandum of
Understanding, it may require the Director of the Enforcement Divi-
sion for the SEC or CFTC to certify that the request is cognizable
under the terms of the memorandum.8 7 The U.K. MOU further pro-
vides that the DTI "may not challenge such a certification except on
substantial grounds which shall be fully stated in writing."88
If a request is valid, the DTI will provide that information which it
has in its possession 9 and will use its best efforts to obtain any re-
quested information which it does not have.90 If the costs of providing
or obtaining information are substantial, the DTI can require the SEC
83. The memorandum includes in its coverage violations of:
the statutes, rules, and requirements of the United States ... relating to the pre-
vention of insider dealing in, and market manipulation in, securities listed on an
investment exchange or a national securities exchange, or quoted in an automated
inter-dealer quotation system, or traded over-the-counter, where the exchange, sys-
tem, or over-the-counter market is situated within, and a material part of any of
the relevant transactions in securities are effected within, the territory of the re-
questing Authority ....
Id. at 1Il.
84. Id. at T 7(d).
85. Id. at I 7(a).
86. Id. at 7(b).
87. Id. at 7(d).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 4. There is a caveat however. "[The] Memorandum does not extend
to information held by the DTI soley by virtue of powers and functions that relate to
matters other than securities, investments, futures, or company law." Id. at T 6.
90. Id. at 4.
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or CFTC to pay the costs.9" Additionally, the request may be denied by
the U.K. Secretary of State after consultation with relevant U.S. Gov-
ernment Officials if it is in the public interest.9"
The U.K. MOU governs exchanges of information between Au-
thorities, and no private person or party is given a right to resist.9" This
provision is contrary to the Swiss MOU which provides an individual
with the opportunity to establish to the reasonable satisfaction of the
Commission that he did not engage in any of the suspicious transac-
tions or that he is not an insider within the MOU definition. 9 If the
individual can make such a showing, the Swiss Commission will not
disclose the information requested.95 While it may seem appropriate to
provide an alleged wrongdoer with the opportunity to clear himself
early, the deficiency of the Swiss procedure is that the alleged wrong-
doer has the opportunity to clear himself in a proceeding which is not
adversarial, and the SEC cannot appeal the decision. 96
Like the Swiss Memorandum of Understanding, the U.K. Memo-
randum of Understanding is also intended to be an interim agree-
ment.97 The Memorandum notes that the Authorities shall use their
best efforts to ensure that treaty negotiations begin within one year.98
C. Japanese Memorandum of Understanding
A memorandum on the sharing of information between the SEC
and the Securities Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Finance was
signed May 23, 1986. 9 The background for the memorandum is con-
tained in the following excerpt:
The Securities Bureau . . . and the [SEC] . . . believe it is in the
best interest of all nations to expose and prosecute those who would
abuse the integrity of the international securities markets. The par-
ties recognize that the growing internationalization of the securities
markets has resulted in significant trading of securities of one coun-
try in the other ...
91. Id. at 13.
92. Id. at 5.
93. Id. at 3.
94. Swiss MOU at art. 11, 3.
95. Agreement at art. IV, 1 2.
96. Compare supra note 75 and accompanying text.
97. U.K. MOU at T 17.
98. Id.
99. U.S., Japan Sign Accord to Share Surveillance, Investigatory Information, 18
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 769 (May 30, 1986).
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It is the expectation of both parties that the interaction of the
Japanese and United States securities markets will continue to
grow. The parties believe that this is a positive development which
should be encouraged. . . . [Ilt is of increasing importance that
there be established procedures for the two parties to share surveil-
lance and investigative information . . . . This would no doubt
serve us in improving the protection of investors, in securing ade-
quate supervision of . . . securities-related businesses, and in
preventing fraudulent securities transactions in the respective
countries. 00
This is the least specific agreement which the SEC has entered
into, but it at least puts the Japanese government on record as recog-
nizing the problem of enforcing U.S. securities laws in an international
market and agreeing to cooperate. The efficacious portion of the agree-
ment is limited to the following portion of one sentence: "[T]he Securi-
ties Bureau and the Securities and Exchange Commission agree to fa-
cilitate each agency's respective requests for surveillance and
investigatory information on a case-by-case basis."'10
D. Treaty With the Cayman Islands
A treaty with the Cayman Islands relating to mutual legal assis-
tance in criminal matters was signed July 3, 1986.102 The treaty is not
yet in force as it has not been ratified by the U.S. Senate. Additionally,
the treaty must be approved by the British Parliament because the
Cayman Islands are a British Crown Colony.
Because the treaty involves the United Kingdom there are similar-
ities with the U.K. MOU. A key distinction is that the agreement with
the Cayman Islands is an unratified treaty dealing with criminal mat-
ters in general whereas the agreement with the U.K. DTI is a memo-
randum strictly limited to securities and futures transactions. One re-
sulting difference is that the Cayman Islands Treaty is not an interim
agreement as is the U.K. MOU. Another distinction is that the Cay-
100. Memorandum of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
and the Securities Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Finance on the Sharing of
Information at para. 3 (May 23, 1986) (obtained from SEC) [hereinafter Japanese
Memorandum].
101. Id. at para. 3.
102. Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning the Cayman Islands Relating to Mu-
tual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (July 3, 1986) (printed in Appendix) [here-
inafter Cayman Islands Treaty].
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man Islands Treaty goes well beyond an exchange of information and
includes, for example, the transfer of persons in custody."' 3
The Cayman Islands Treaty is tailor-made to cover violation of
U.S. securities laws. The treaty defines "criminal offense" to include
insider trading and fraudulent securities practices, and these two terms
are defined in the same terminology used in the U.S.1"4
The procedure, although similar to that in the U.K. MOU, is not
identical. Requests must be submitted in writing. 10 5 There is no excep-
tion for urgent cases as provided in the U.K. agreement. A request
under the Cayman Islands Treaty is to contain similar information as a
request under the U.K. MOU.106 The request must include the nature
of the investigation, the information which the request is based on, a
description of the assistance sought, and the purpose for which the re-
quest is made. 10 7 Assistance may be denied under four sets of circum-
stances: 1) when the request does not conform with the Treaty provi-
sions; 2) when the offense is political or military, and not an offense
under ordinary criminal law; 3) when the request does not establish
reasonable grounds for believing that the crime specified in the request
was committed and the information sought relates to the crime and is
in the territory of the requested party; and 4) when the Attorney Gen-
eral of the requested party has issued a certificate to the effect that the
103. Id. at Art. 1, 1 2.
104. Id. at Art. XIX, I 3(g)-(h). In the words of the Treaty, a criminal offense
includes:
(g) "Insider trading" which means the offer, purchase, or sale of securities by any
person while in possession of material non-public information directly or indirectly
relating to the securities offered, purchased, or sold, in breach of a legally binding
duty of trust or confidence;
(h) Fraudulent securities practices, which means the use by any person willfully or
dishonestly of any means, directly or indirectly, in connection with the offer,
purchase or sale of any security:
(i) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(ii) dishonestly to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in light of the
circumstances under which it was made, not misleading; or
(iii) dishonestly to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person; . ...
105. Id. at Art. IV, l 1.
106. Art. IV, 2 of the Treaty states what information must accompany a re-
quest, and Art. IV, 3 lists additional information to be provided to the extent neces-
sary and possible. This section is substantially the same as 7(b) of the U.K. MOU.
The Cayman Islands Treaty is a bit more elaborate, stating for example that a request
should include addresses, birthdates and presumed locations when available. However,
it seems likely that such information would always be provided when available.
107. Cayman Islands Treaty at Art. IV, 2.
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execution of the request is contrary to the public interest of the re-
quested party. 1 8 However, before assistance is denied the requested
party is to consult with the requesting party "to consider whether assis-
tance can be given subject to such conditions as it deems necessary."10 9
As with the Swiss and U.K. agreements, the Cayman Islands
Treaty requires that information and evidence furnished be kept confi-
dential and not used for any purpose other than what was stated in the
request." 0 Furthermore, the Treaty contains a provision enabling the
requesting party to request that the application for and granting of as-
sistance be kept confidential.1 ' This provision is contrary to the Swiss
MOU which requires that the customer be informed of the investiga-
tion. 2 Under the Treaty, if "the request cannot be executed without
breaking confidentiality, the Central Authority of the Requested Party
shall so inform the Central Authority of the Requesting Party which
shall then determine whether the request should nevertheless be
executed." ' 3
As was previously stated, the Treaty goes beyond an exchange of
information. It provides for compulsory appearances to testify and pro-
duce evidence. " Appearances and the production of documentary in-
formation and articles in the Cayman Islands can only be compelled in
accordance with the law of the Cayman Islands.113 A person in the
Cayman Islands cannot be compelled to appear in the U.S." 6 A re-
quest for a search, seizure, and delivery of an article is to be executed
only "if it includes the information justifying such action under the
laws of the Requested Party." ' Additionally, the Treaty provides for
the reimbursement of certain costs incurred in executing a request. 18
The Treaty, like the U.K. MOU, does not create any right on the
part of any private person to suppress evidence or impede a request." 9
108. Id. at Art. 1II, 7 3.
109. Id. at Art. III, 7 4.
110. Id. at Art. VII, $7 1-2. The Cayman Islands Treaty pertains to all kinds of
criminal conduct, and hence, information obtained pursuant to it may be used by any
law enforcement agency providing that either the use is for a purpose stated in the
request or prior consent of the Cayman Islands is obtained.
111. Id. at Art. VII, 3.
112. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
113. Id.
114. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
115. Cayman Islands Treaty at Art. VIII, 1 1.
116. Id. at Art. X, 1 1.
117. Id. at Art. XIV, 7 1.
118. Id. at Art. VI.
119. Id. at Art. I, T 3.
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As with both the Swiss and U.K. MOU's, the Treaty provides for con-
sultations between the governments to discuss its effectiveness. '2
The Treaty also contains a Protocol in which it is agreed that:
The terms of this Treaty may be made applicable, in whole or in
part, to Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, Monteserrat or the
Turks and Caicos Islands by Exchange of Notes between the Gov-
ernments of the United States and United Kingdom. Such Notes
shall specify the central authority of the concerned jurisdictions for
purposes of assistance under this Treaty. 2 '
E. Understanding With Ontario
An articulation of an understanding between the SEC and the On-
tario Securities Commission (OSC) is contained in a pair of letters ex-
changed between the two commissions on September 24, 1985.122 The
exchange of letters focuses on the linkage between the American Stock
Exchange, Inc. (Amex) and the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE). The
Amex-TSE Plan provides mechanisms for the routine exchange of in-
formation between the exchanges.2 In addition, the Plan requires the
Amex and TSE to "cooperate fully" with one another and use "best
efforts" to assist one another in investigations." 4 The TSE and Amex
are self-regulating bodies;"15 nevertheless it is understood "that there
may be circumstances which require the participation of both the OSC
and SEC to conduct meaningful investigations.' '
The SEC and OSC are committed to cooperating with each other
in such investigations. 2 7 Furthermore, this understanding is consistent
with past history."28 "This cooperation would, of course, extend to as-
sisting the SEC in obtaining information that cannot be obtained
120. Id. at Art. XVIII.
121. Id. at Protocol.
122. Letter from Ermanno Pascutto, Director, Ontario Securities Commission to
Richard Ketchum and Gary Lynch (September 24, 1985) (discussing cooperation be-
tween OSC and SEC) [hereinafter OSC Letter]; Letter from Richard Ketchum, Direc-
tor, Division of Market Regulation and Gary Lynch, Director, Division of Enforce-
ment, Securities and Exchange Commission to Ermanno Pascutto (September 24,
1985) (discussing cooperation between OSC and SEC) [hereinafter SEC Letter].
123. SEC Letter, supra note 122, at 2.
124. Id. at 3.
125. OSC Letter, supra note 122, at 2. See SEC Letter, supra note 122, at 3.
126. OSC Letter, supra note 122, at 2.
127. OSC Letter, supra note 122, at 2; See SEC Letter, supra note 122, at 3.
128. OSC Letter, supra note 122, at 2; See SEC Letter, supra note 122, at 1.
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through the channels provided for in the linkage plan."'2 9 It is expected
that the TSE, as a self-regulatory agency subject to OSC oversight,
will generally provide necessary information voluntarily.'
In the event of resistance to an OSC investigation, the OSC may
issue a formal order of investigation.' A formal order gives the OSC
power to compel testimony under oath and the production of docu-
ments. 3 2 It also empowers the OSC to audit the party and freeze the
party's assets. 33 However, the investigatory powers extend only to per-
sons within Ontario. 3 " Nevertheless, "the OSC has a close working re-
lationship with the securities administrators in other provinces and ter-
ritories of Canada,'1 3 5 and is willing to take advantage of these
relationships to assist the SEC.'
It should be noted that Canadian law permits the Attorney Gen-
eral to "prohibit disclosure of information in cases where a foreign tri-
bunal is exercising powers that have adversely affected significant Ca-
nadian interests in relation to international trade or commerce or that
has otherwise infringed Canadian sovereignty.' 3 7 The OSC has ex-
pressed its belief that this is unlikely to happen with regard to informa-
tion exchanges between the OSC and SEC:
As insider trading and market manipulation are offences under the
Securities Act (Ontario) or the Criminal Code (Canada), it is ex-
tremely unlikely that the Canadian Government would have any
interest in protecting those who have engaged in such trading. It is
important to note that the Federal Government [of Canada], in en-
acting the legislation, described it as a "mechanism of last resort"
and "clearly designed to protect national sovereignty in exceptional
cases". [sic] It is difficult to conceive of an insider trading, market
manipulation, or other case involving improper trading of securities
that would fall into that category, particularly when such trading is
a well recognized criminal offence in both Canada and the United
States.'
129. OSC Letter, supra note 122, at 2.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2-3.
133. Id.




138. Id. at 4.
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F. Treaty With Canada
The Treaty with Canada on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters was signed March 18, 1985, but the U.S. Senate has not yet voted
on ratification. 8 9 The key aspects of the Canadian Treaty are similar
to the Cayman Islands Treaty and the U.K. MOU so only a brief
description is in order.
The treaty clearly covers violations of U.S. securities laws. "The
definition of offence includes . . . offences under the law of the United
States in .. . securities .... 140 The treaty further provides that
"[a]ssistance shall be provided without regard to whether the conduct
under investigation or prosecution in the Requesting State constitutes
an offence or may be prosecuted by the Requested State."'
The Canadian Treaty is less formal than the Cayman Islands
Treaty. Practical arrangements are left to be worked out by future
agreement."" As with the U.K. MOU and the Cayman Islands Treaty,
the Canadian Treaty "shall not give rise to a right on the part of a
private party to obtain, suppress or exclude any evidence or to impede
the execution of a request."1 " The purpose of the Treaty is exclusively
to provide mutual legal assistance between the countries. Additionally,
the Canadian Treaty also provides for the reimbursement of certain
costs incurred in rendering assistance.'44
IV. ANALYSIS
The accords vary substantially in their coverage from the Japanese
Memorandum which merely agrees to cooperate on a case-by-case ba-
sis to the formal Swiss MOU which draws a relatively bright line be-
tween what is and is not covered.
The several accords will vary in their effectiveness, but certainly
all of them will aid the SEC. The Swiss MOU is the most limited ac-
cord by its own terms; however, even the Swiss MOU enabled the SEC
to eventually obtain the cooperation of the Swiss government for the
first time in what had been at that time the largest insider trading case
139. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Canada on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, March 18,
1985, 24 I.L.M. 1092 [hereinafter Canadian Treaty].
140. Id. at Annex.
141. Id. at art. III, T 3.
142. "The Parties may agree on such practical measures as may be necessary to
facilitate the implementation of this Treaty." Canadian Treaty at art. XVIII, 2.
143. Id. at art. II, 1 4.
144. Id. at art. VIII.
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uncovered by the SEC.145 The Swiss MOU has also been utilized since
then to obtain evidence in another case which resulted in the disgorge-
ment of more than a million dollars in illegal profits.""
The accords with the United Kingdom, Canada, and Cayman Is-
lands are very similar, and it will be convenient to group them. These
countries have especially good relationships with the U.S. Each is a
military ally or the colony of a military ally, all are English speaking,
and there is a substantial interdependence in their economies. All of
these ties may contribute to the similarities of the accords. Addition-
ally, the United Kingdom is a third party to the Cayman Islands
Treaty.
One element which is common to all of the accords is the right of
the Central Authority to block disclosure of information in the national
interests. It seems likely that this provision will be standard in future
accords. The Swiss agreement, however, goes further by protecting the
interests of innocent private third parties. 47 The Swiss Federal Office
for Police Matters may block assistance if it determines that considera-
ble harm will be caused to third persons who appear to have no rela-
tionship to the offense under investigation.' 8 There is definitely a gap
between what an American would consider a significant infringement
on the interests of an innocent third party and what a Swiss would
consider a significant infringement.4 9 The U.S. Supreme Court has
held that there is no "legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the
information kept in bank records.' 5 0 In contrast, the Swiss have recog-
nized confidentialty in banking since the sixteenth century, and viola-
tion of banking secrecy has been a criminal offense since 1935.'5' Given
this marked difference in traditions, any disclosure which would reveal
145. "Entry of the settlement [of Santa Fe] brings to a conclusion the largest
insider trading case [at that time] ever commenced by the [Securities and Exchange]
Commission." Santa Fe, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T
92,484. Since then, the size of the Santa Fe case has been dwarfed by a case which
resulted in the disgorgement of $50 million in profits and a $50 million fine. SEC v.
Boesky, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 92,991 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 14, 1986).
146. SEC v. Katz, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
92,867.
147. Supra note 53.
148. Id.
149. See generally Note, Insider Trading Laws and Swiss Banks: Recent Hope
for Reconciliation, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNATN'L. L. 303, 318-22 (discussing differences
in Swiss and U.S. attitudes towards secrecy).
150. Id. at 318.
151. U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976).
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information about an innocent party's finances might be blocked.1"2 It
remains to be seen whether future agreements with other countries will
follow the Swiss in this respect.
Another standard feature in these accords, which is somewhat re-
lated to the governments' reservation of power to block disclosure, is
the requirement that any information obtained pursuant to the accord
be kept confidential to the extent possible and used only for law en-
forcement purposes. In theory, a limitation on the use of information
should reduce the need for blocking disclosure. More limitations on the
use of information make it less necessary to block disclosure of infor-
mation. Perhaps limitations on the use of information can establish ad-
equate protection for innocent third parties so that the blocking of dis-
closure can be restricted to matters of national interest. Although the
Swiss agreement places the standard limitations on the use of informa-
tion, the Swiss apparently do not consider this to be an adequate safe-
guard since the circumstances under which assistance may be blocked
are broadly defined.
One distinction between the Swiss MOU and the accords with the
U.K., the Cayman Islands, and Canada is that the Swiss MOU makes
no provision for reimbursement of costs. The other accords contain
some such provision."' This may be a function of the variation in the
type of assistance available under the accords. The Swiss MOU is di-
rected at disclosure of bank records while the other agreements provide
more extensive assistance.
The key distinction between the Swiss accord and the others is in
whose laws determine when assistance is available. U.S. law plays ab-
solutely no role in the determination of whether assistance shall be pro-
vided under the Swiss Accords. In contrast, the agreements with the
U.K., the Cayman Islands, Canada, and Ontario all provide assistance
when there are reasonable grounds for believing that a violation of U.S.
law has occurred without regard to the laws of the domestic country.
Even the Japanese MOU does not foreclose this approach.
This approach is of tremendous value to the SEC relative to the
alternative Swiss approach of using a standard other than U.S. law in
determining the availability of assistance. The latter may create some
serious problems. It seems likely that the overall impact of the Swiss
accord will be to reduce the amount of illegal insider profits obtained in
U.S. securities markets, but some illegal transactions might be facili-
tated. Consider the following two hypotheticals. A director with knowl-
152. Compare supra note 149.
153. See supra notes 91, 117, and 143 and accompanying text.
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edge of the discovery of a large deposit of valuable minerals effects an
illegal trade through a Swiss bank."" The Swiss accord sends a clear
signal that no assistance will be forthcoming for the SEC in this scena-
rio. Second, a domineering director has knowledge of a pending
merger. " The director effects an illegal transaction through a Swiss
bank knowing that the Swiss banking secrecy laws will protect him if
he can delay the merger announcement for 26 days. Not only is an
illegal trade encouraged, but there is potentially a delay in full disclo-
sure of material information.
Besides cases in which the result will clearly be undesirable from
the SEC's point of view, there will be cases in which the result is uncer-
tain. Suppose a clerical employee finds a note written by an officer re-
garding a tender offer and trades on it. He would not be an insider
under parts (a) or (b) of the definition in the Agreement, but would
arguably be an insider under part (c). 156 Part (c) includes persons who
act on the basis of inside information received from an officer of the
company. 157 Arguably, the clerk received information from the officer
in this hypothetical, although the officer did not consciously tip him.
Notwithstanding this argument, the Commission of Inquiry could find
that the clerk did not receive the information from the officer and
hence is not an insider. While it must be admitted that the outcome of
this hypothetical under U.S. law is not entirely certain, it seems likely
that the requisite breach of a duty would be found. 158 In any event,
once the Swiss make the decision to block assistance, the SEC is effec-
tively denied an opportunity to litigate their case.
There are also practical procedural problems suggested by this hy-
pothetical. If the SEC does not know the identity of the purchaser, the
154. Compare Texas Gulf Sulphur, 312 F.Supp. 77 (in which insiders who traded
or tipped others who traded on nonpublic information regarding the discovery of valua-
ble minerals were required to disgorge profits).
155. Cf. Santa Fe, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
92,484 (in which the merger announcement took place within 25 days of the illegal
transactions).
156. See supra note 50.
157. Id.
158. The Supreme Court has held that breach of a duty is required in order to
impose liability for trading on material nonpublic information. Chiarella v. U.S., 445
U.S. 222 (1980). The requisite breach of duty was found in Texas Gulf Sulphur, 312
F.Supp. 77 (finding that the fiduciary which corporate officers and directors owe share-
holders requires them to disclose or refrain from trading on material nonpublic infor-
mation). While a clerical employee might not owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders, he
may be found to owe a duty to the corporation requiring him not to misappropriate the
information. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 313
n.22 (1985); U.S. v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
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Commission of Inquiry's decision may be based solely on the state-
ments made by the purchaser. A tippee who would not be an insider
had he not been tipped might avoid an extensive investigation by deny-
ing that he was tipped. An additional problem would be encountered by
the SEC if the tender premium were relatively small. In that case, it is
less likely that the price or volume fluctuation threshhold will be
crossed. Recall that the Swiss accord establishes an irrefutable pre-
sumption that the SEC has reasonable grounds to investigate when a
securities' price or volume fluctuates by more than 50% during a speci-
fied period. 159 If the unannounced tender offer premium will be a mod-
est 25%, it is less likely that the threshold will be crossed. This puts the
burden on the SEC to make an affirmative showing of reasonable
grounds.160 The alternative, exemplified by the U.K. MOU, does not
impose a burden to show reasonable grounds if the request is certified
as cognizable under the accord.""
The point is that although the Swiss accord will probably reduce
U.S. securities law violations effected through Swiss banks, drawing a
fairly bright line which is incongruent with U.S. law will inevitably put
some people in a position to take advantage of the incongruency. There
is a trade-off between protecting the integrity of the U.S. securities
markets on the one hand, and foreign governments protecting their sov-
ereignty and the privacy rights of their citizens on the other. The bal-
ance striken in the Swiss accord appears to give less weight to the in-
tegrity of the U.S. securities markets than the U.K., Cayman Islands,
and Canadian accords.
The most damaging criticism to the efforts to negotiate these ac-
cords is the argument that these agreements will simply cause those
with a propensity for violating U.S. securities laws to move their bank-
ing business from traditional banking havens, like Switzerland and the
Cayman Islands, to other banking havens like the Bahamas. It is possi-
ble that new banking havens will develop as rapidly as old ones ac-
comodate U.S. requests. The drawback of the bilateral agreements is
that they are piecemeal resolution of the problem. There is a strong
argument that piecemeal resolution does not resolve the problem-it
merely causes the problem to resurface elsewhere.
Carried to its logical conclusion, this argument suggests that these
bilateral agreements will have no impact on the volume of illegal inside
transactions. This is an extreme and unlikely result. While it seems
159. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
160. Id.
161. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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certain that some insider trading will move from Switzerland and the
Cayman Islands (upon ratification of the treaty) it seems unlikely that
all of it will move. The net effect should be some reduction in insider
trading in U.S. securities markets. The important question is how sig-
nificant will the reduction be and how does it compare with the re-
sources expended on negotiating these bilateral agreements? This is an
empirical question which can only be answered definitively, if ever,
with the passage of time and the benefit of hindsight.
V. CONCLUSION
The bilateral agreements discussed in this Comment lead to piece-
meal resolution of the problem of enforcing U.S. securities laws in an
international market, but unilateral action by the U.S. is held in disfa-
vor by some." 2 A multinational agreement between all the countries of
the world does not appear feasible-the incentives to not go along will
probably be too great for at least some countries. Therefore, enforce-
ment of U.S. securities laws would seem to depend on the successful-
ness of bilateral agreements at this time. Given this, it is important to
develop a model agreement.
The most significant difference in these accords is in the determi-
nation of when assistance is to be provided. The Swiss accord defines
the conditions under which assistance may be provided without regard
to U.S. law. The accords with the U.K., the Cayman Islands, and Can-
ada tie assistance to violations of U.S. law. Privacy interests and for-
eign sovereignty are sufficiently protected by requiring first that the
SEC establish reasonable grounds for suspecting that a violation of
U.S. law has occurred. Once the foreign government is satisfied that
this first requirement has been fulfilled, the foreign government can
conduct an investigation on the SEC's behalf and compile a report.
Any material which might be harmful to its national interest can be
deleted from the report. The U.S. can then pay the reasonable costs
incurred. This is the basic approach of the accords with the U.K., Cay-
man Islands, and Canada. It strikes the proper balance between pro-
tecting the integrity of the U.S. securities markets and protecting the
sovereignty of foreign governments and the privacy of their banking
sectors. It seems to be an approach which is superior to the Swiss
approach.
It has been reported that the SEC is negotiating with Germany,
162. See generally Boyle, supra note 3; Bschorr, supra note 18; Capitani, supra
note 8; Liftin, supra note 3; Moessle, supra note 6; Newcomb, supra note 17; but see
Fedders, supra note I.
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France, 6 ' and the International Association of Securities Commis-
sions"' on securities regulation in an internationalized securities mar-
ket. It remains to be seen whether accords with these organizations will
be tied to U.S. laws or follow the Swiss approach and define their own
coverage.
Mark S. Klock
163. U.S., Great Britain Nearing Accord on Facilitating Information Requests,
18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1096 (July 25, 1986).
164. Conference Creates Panel to Promote Securities Law Enforcement World-




BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND CONCERNING THE CAYMAN ISLANDS
RELATING TO
MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS*
The Government of the United States of American and the Gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land, including the Government of the Cayman Islands;
Desiring to improve the effectiveness of the law enforcement au-
thorities of both the United States of America and the Cayman Islands
in the investigation, prosecution, and suppression of crime through co-
operation and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters;
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
Scope of Assistance
1. The Parties shall provide mutual assistance, in accordance
with the provisions of this Treaty, for the investigation, prosecution,
and suppression of criminal offenses of the nature and in the circum-
stances set out in this Treaty, including the civil and administrative
proceedings referred to in paragraph 3(c) of Article 19.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, assistance shall include:
(a) taking the testimony or statements of persons;
(b) providing documents, records, and articles of evidence;
(c) serving documents;
(d) locating persons;
(e) transferring persons in custody for testimony;
(f) executing requests for searches and seizures;
(g) immobilizing criminally obtained assets;
(h) assistance in proceedings related to forfeiture, restitution and
collection of fines; and
(i) any other steps deemed appropriate by both Central
Authorities.
3. This Treaty is intended solely for mutual legal assistance be-
* Reproduced from copy provided by the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission. Signatures, forms, and protocol are omitted.
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tween the Parties. The provisions of this Treaty shall not create any
right on the part of any private person to obtain, suppress, or exclude
any evidence, or to impede the execution of a request.
ARTICLE 2
Central Authorities
1. A Central Authority shall be established by each Party.
2. For the United States of America, the Central Authority shall
be the Attorney General or a person designated by him. For the Cay-
man Islands the Central Authority shall be the Cayman Mutual Legal
Assistance Authority or a person designated by it.
3. Requests under this Treaty shall be made by the Central Au-




1. The assistance afforded by this Treaty shall not extend to:
(a) any matter which relates directly or indirectly to the regula-
tion, including the imposition, calculation, and collection, of
taxes, except for any matter falling within sub-paragraphs
3(d) and 3(e) of Article 19; or
(b) any conduct not punishable by imprisonment of more than
one year.
2. The Central Authority of the Requested Party may deny as-
sistance where:
(a) the request is not made in conformity with the provisions of
this Treaty;
(b) the request relates to a political offense or to an offense under
military law which would not be an offense under ordinary
criminal law; or
(c) the request does not establish that there are reasonable
grounds for believing:
(i) that the criminal offense specified in the request has been
committed; and
(ii) that the information sought relates to the offense and is lo-
cated in the territory of the Requested Party.
SEC INVESTIGATIONS
3. The Central Authority shall deny assistance where the Attor-
ney General of the Requested Party has issued a certificate to the effect
that the execution of the request is contrary to the public interest of the
Requested Party.
4. Before denying assistance pursuant to this Article the Central
Authority of the Requested Party shall consult with the Central Au-
thority of the Requesting Party to consider whether assistance can be
given subject to such conditions as it deems necessary. If the Request-
ing Party accepts assistance subject to these conditions, it shall comply
with the conditions.
ARTICLE 4
Form and Contents of Requests
1. Requests shall be submitted in writing by the Central Author-
ity of the Requesting Party in such form as may from time to time be
agreed between the Central Authorities.
2. The request shall include the following:
(a) the name of the authority conducting the investigation or pro-
ceeding to which the request relates;
(b) the subject matter and nature of the investigation or proceed-
ing for the purposes of which the request is made and in par-
ticular the criminal offense or offenses for the investigation,
prosecution or suppression of which the assistance is
requested;
(c) information concerning the persons involved including, where
available, their full names, dates of birth, and addresses;
(d) the information relied upon in support of the request;
(e) a description of the evidence, information or other assistance
sought; such description shall specify where possible the time
period to which any such evidence or information relates;
(f) the purpose for which the evidence or information or other as-
sistance is sought; and
(g) the identity and presumed location, where known, of any per-
son from whom evidence is sought.
19871
270 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 11
3. To the extent necessary and possible, a request shall also
include:
(a) the identity and location of a person to be served, that per-
son's relationship to the proceedings, and the manner in which
service is to be made;
(b) available information on the identity and whereabouts of a
person to be located;
(c) a precise description of the place or person to be searched and
of the articles to be seized;
(d) a description of the manner in which any testimony or state-
ment is to be taken and recorded;
(e) a list of questions to be asked of a witness;
(f) a description of any particular procedure to be followed in ex-
ecuting the request;
(g) information as to the allowances and expenses to which a per-
son asked to appear in the territory of the Requesting Party
will be entitled; and
(h) any other information which may be brought to the attention




1. The Central Authority of the Requested Party shall promptly
execute any request or, when appropriate, shall transmit it to the au-
thority having jurisdiction to do so. The competent authorities of the
Requested Party shall do everything in their power to execute the re-
quest. The Courts of the Requested Party shall have jurisdiction to is-
sue subpoenas, search warrants, or other orders necessary to execute
the request.
2. When execution of the request requires judicial or administra-
tive action, the request shall be presented to the appropriate authority
by the persons designated by the Central Authority of the Requested
Party.
3. Requests shall be executed in accordance with the laws of the
Requested Party except to the extent that this Treaty provides other-
wise. However, the method of execution specified in the request shall be
followed except insofar as it is prohibited by the laws of the Requested
Party.
4. If execution of the request would interfere with an ongoing
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criminal investigation or proceeding in the territory of the Requested
Party, the Central Authority of that Party may postpone execution or
make execution subject to conditions determined necessary after con-
sultations with the Requesting Party. If the Requesting Party accepts
the assistance subject to the conditions it shall comply with the
conditions.
5. The Central Authority of the Requested Party shall promptly
inform the Central Authority of the Requesting Party of the outcome
of the execution of the request. If the request is denied, the Central
Authority of the Requested Party shall inform the Central Authority of
the Requesting Party of the reasons for the denial.
ARTICLE 6
Costs
1. The following expenses, and none other, incurred in executing
a request shall be reimbursed by the Requesting Party upon application
of the Central Authority of the Requested Party:
(a) travel expenses of a witness presenting testimony in the terri-
tory of the Requesting Party;
(b) fees of expert witnesses retained with the approval of the Cen-
tral Authority of the Requesting Party;
(c) fees of counsel appointed or retained with the approval of the
Central Authority of the Requesting Party for a witness giv-
ing testimony;
(d) reasonable costs of locating, reproducing, and transporting to
the Central Authority of the Requesting Party documents or
records specified in a request;
(e) costs of stenographic reports requested by the Central Author-
ity of the Requesting Party, other than reports prepared by a
salaried government employee; and
(f) reasonable costs of interpreters or translators.
2. A witness who appears in the territory of the Requesting
Party pursuant to Article 10 shall be entitled to the same fees and
allowances ordinarily accorded to a witness in the territory of the Re-
questing Party.
3. A witness who appears in the territory of the Requested Party
pursuant to Article 8 shall be entitled to such fees and allowances as
shall be agreed between the Central Authorities.
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ARTICLE 7
Limitations On Use
1. The Requesting Party shall not use any information or evi-
dence obtained under this Treaty for any purposes other than for the
investigation, prosecution or suppression in the territory of the Request-
ing Party of those criminal offenses stated in the request without the
prior consent of the Requested Party.
2. Unless otherwise agreed by both Central Authorities, informa-
tion or evidence furnished under this Treaty shall be kept confidential,
except to the extent that the information or evidence is needed for in-
vestigations or proceedings forming part of the prosecution of a crimi-
nal offense described in the request.
3. The Central Authority of the Requesting Party may request
that the application for assistance, its contents and related documents,
and the granting of assistance be kept confidential. If the request can-
not be executed without breaking confidentiality, the Central Authority
of the Requested Party shall so inform the Central Authority of the
Requesting Party which shall then determine whether the request
should nevertheless be executed.
4. Except as may be permitted under paragraph 1, any informa-
tion or evidence obtained under this Treaty which has been made pub-
lic in the territory of the Requesting Party in a proceeding forming
part of the prosecution of a criminal offense described in the request
may be used only for the following additional purposes:
(a) where a trial results in a conviction for any criminal offense
within the scope of this Treaty, for any purpose against the
person(s) convicted;
(b) whether or not a trial results in the conviction of any person,
in the prosecution of any person for any criminal offense
within the scope of this Treaty; and
(c) in civil or administrative proceedings, only if and to the extent
that such proceedings relate to:
(i) the recovery of the unlawful-proceeds of a criminal offense
within the scope of this Treaty from a person who has
knowingly received them;
(ii) the collection of tax or enforcement of tax penalties result-
ing from the knowing receipt of the unlawful proceeds of a
criminal offense within the scope of this Treaty; or
(iii) the recovery in rem of the unlawful proceeds or instrumen-




Taking Testimony and Producing Evidence
in the Territory of the Requested Party
1. A person requested to testify or to produce documentary infor-
mation or articles in the territory of the Requested Party may be com-
pelled to do so in accordance with the requirements of the law of the
Requested Party.
2. If the person referred to in paragraph 1 asserts a claim of im-
munity, incapacity, or privilege under the laws of the Requesting Party
the evidence shall nonetheless be taken and the claim made known to
the Requesting Party for resolution by authorities of that Party.
3. The Requesting Party shall furnish information in advance
about the date and place of the taking of the evidence pursuant to this
Article.
4. The Requested Party shall authorize the presence of such per-
sons as are specified in the request during the taking of any evidence in
the territory of the Requested Party and shall allow persons designated
in the request to question the person whose testimony or evidence is
being taken.
5. Documentary information other than official records produced
in the territory of the Requested Party pursuant to this Article shall be
authenticated by the attestation of a person competent to do so in the
manner indicated in Form A appended to this Treaty.
ARTICLE 9
Providing Records of Government Agencies
1. The Requested Party shall provide the Requesting Party with
copies of publicly available records of government departments and
agencies in the territory of the Requested Party.
2. The Requested Party may provide copies of any record or in-
formation in the possession of a government department or agency in
the territory of that Party but not publicly available to the same extent
and under the same conditions as it would be available to its own law
enforcement or judicial authorities.
3. Official records produced pursuant to this Article shall be au-
thenticated by the attestation of an authorized person in the manner
indicated in Form B appended to this Treaty. The attestation shall be
signed by, and state the official position of, the attesting person, and
the seal of the authority executing the request shall be affixed thereto.
Authentication of official records shall be carried out under the provi-
sions of the Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalization for
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Foreign Public Documents, dated 5 October 1961.
ARTICLE 10
Appearance in the Territory of the Requesting Party
1. When the appearance of a person who is in the territory of the
Requested Party is needed in the territory of the Requesting Party for
the purpose of the execution of a request under this Treaty, the Central
Authority of the Requesting Party may request that the Central Au-
thority of the other Party invite the person to appear before the appro-
priate authority in the territory of the Requesting Party. The response
of the person shall be communicated promptly to the Central Authority
of the Requesting Party. Such a person shall be under no compulsion to
accept such an invitation.
2. A person appearing in the territory of the Requesting Party
pursuant to this Article shall not be subject to service of process or be
detained or subjected to any restriction of personal liberty by reason of
any acts or convictions in either the territory of the Requesting or Re-
quested Party which preceded his departure from the territory of the
Requested Party.
3. The safe conduct provided for by this Article shall cease ten
days after the person has been notified in writing by the appropriate
authorities that his presence is no longer required, or if the person has
left the territory of the Requesting Party and voluntarily returned to it.
ARTICLE 11
Transferring Persons in Custody for Testimonial Purposes
1. A person in the custody of the Requested Party who is needed
as a witness in connection with the execution of a request in the terri-
tory of the Requesting Party shall be transported to the territory of
that Party if the person and the Requested Party consent.
2. A person in the custody of the Requesting Party whose pres-
ence in the territory of the Requested Party is needed in connection
with the execution of a request under this Treaty may be transported to
the territory of the Requested Party if the person and both Parties
consent.
3. For the purpose of this Article:
(a) the Receiving Party shall be responsible for the safety and
health of the person transferred and have the authority and
obligation to keep the person transferred in custody unless
otherwise authorized by the Sending Party;
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(b) the Receiving Party shall return the person transferred to the
custody of the Sending Party as soon as circumstances permit
or as otherwise agreed and in any event no later than the date
upon which he would have been released from custody in the
territory of the Sending Party; and
(c) the person transferred shall receive credit for service of the
sentence imposed in the territory of the Sending Party for
time served in the custody of the Receiving Party.
ARTICLE 12
Location of Persons
1. The Requested Party shall take all necessary measures to lo-
cate or identify persons who are believed to be in the territory of that
Party hnd who are needed in connection with the investigation, prose-
cution or suppression of a criminal offense in the territory of the Re-
questing Party.
2. The Requested Party shall promptly communicate the results
of its inquiries to the Requesting Party.
ARTICLE 13
Service of Documents
1. The Requested Party shall effect service of any document re-
lating to or forming part of any request for assistance properly made
under the provisions of this Treaty transmitted to it for this purpose by
the Requesting Party; provided that the Requested Party shall not be
obliged to serve any subpoena or other process requiring the attendance
of any person before any authority or tribunal in the territory of the
Requesting Party.
2. The Requesting Party shall transmit any such request for the
service of a document inviting the appearance of a person before an
authority in the territory of the Requesting Party to the Requested
Party a reasonable time before the scheduled appearance.
3. The Requested Party shall return a proof of service in the
manner specified in the request.
ARTICLE 14
Search and Seizure
1. A request for assistance pursuant to Article 1 involving the
search, seizure and delivery of an article to the Requesting Party shall
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be executed if it includes the information justifying such action under
the laws of the Requested Party.
2. Every official who has custody of a seized article shall certify
the continuity of custody, the identity, and the integrity of its condi-
tion. No further certification shall be required. The certificates shall be
admissible in evidence in the territory of the Requesting Party as evi-
dence of the truth of the matters set forth therein.
3. The Requested Party shall not be obliged to provide any item
seized to the Requesting Party unless that Party has agreed to such
terms and conditions as may be required by the Requested Party to
protect third party interests in the item to be transferred.
ARTICLE 15
Return of Documents and Articles
The Requesting Party shall return any documents or articles fur-
nished to it in the execution of a request under this Treaty as soon as




1. The Central Authority of one Party may notify the Central
Authority of the other Party when it has reason to believe that pro-
ceeds of a criminal offense are located in the territory of the other
Party.
2. The Parties shall assist each other to the extent permitted by
their respective laws in proceedings related to:
(a) the forfeiture of the proceeds of criminal offenses;
(b) restitution to the victims of criminal offenses; and




1. Assistance and procedures set forth in this Treaty shall not
prevent one Party from granting assistance to the other Party through
the provisions of other international agreements or arrangements which
may be applicable.
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2. Subject to the terms of paragraph 1, a Party needing assis-
tance as provided in Article 1 in the investigation, prosecution or sup-
pression of a criminal offense as defined in Article 19 shall request as-
sistance pursuant to this Treaty.
3. No Party shall enforce any compulsory measure, including a
grand jury subpoena, for the production of documents located in the
territory of the other Party with respect to any criminal offense within
the scope of this Treaty, unless its obligations under the Treaty have
first been fulfilled pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article with respect
to a request concerning those documents.
4. Where denial of a request or unreasonable delay in its execu-
tion may be jeopardizing the successful completion of an investigation,
prosecution or other proceeding, the Central Authority of the Request-
ing Party shall so inform the Central Authority of the Requested Party
in writing. Thereafter, either Contracting Party may give at least 45
days' notice in writing to the other Contracting Party that, unless oth-
erwise agreed, the Parties' obligations under this Article shall be
deemed to have been fulfilled; provided that in no case shall the obliga-
tions under this Article be deemed to have been fulfilled sooner than 90
days after the date of receipt of the request for assistance.
ARTICLE 18
Consultations
1. The Central Authorities will consult, at times mutually agreed
by them, to enable the most effective use to be made of this Treaty.
Such consultations shall include such information as may be lawfully
disclosed concerning the status and disposition of proceedings utilizing
documentary information and other evidence secured pursuant to this
Treaty.
2. In any case of difficulty either Central Authority may request




For the purpose of this Treaty:
1. "The Contracting Parties" means the Government of the
United States and the Government of the United Kingdom.
2. "The Parties" means the Government of the United States
and the Government of the Cayman Islands.
3. "Criminal offense" which, except in the case of any matter
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falling within sub-paragraphs (d) and (e) of this definition, does not
include any conduct or matter which relates directly or indirectly to the
regulation, imposition, calculation or collection of taxes, but subject al-
ways to those exclusions, means:
(a) Any conduct punishable by more than one year's imprison-
ment under the laws of both the Requesting and Requested
Parties;
(b) "Racketeering" which means:
(i) the use or investment, directly or indirectly, knowingly by
any person of any part of racketeering income, or the pro-
ceeds of such income, in the acquisition of any interest in,
or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which
is engaged in, or the activities of which affect commerce,
including interstate or foreign commerce;
(ii) the acquisition or maintenance knowingly by any person
through a pattern of racketeering activity or through col-
lection of an unlawful debt, directly or indirectly, of any
interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in,
or the activities of which affect commerce, including inter-
state or foreign commerce; or
(iii) where any person is employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect
commerce, including interstate or foreign commerce, the
conduct or participation in the conduct, directly or indi-
rectly, knowingly by that person of the affairs of the enter-
prise through a pattern of racketeering activity or collec-
tion of unlawful debt; and in respect of which-
(A) "Racketeering income" means any income of any person
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racke-
teering activity or through collection of an unlawful
debt in which such person has participated as a
principal;
(B) "Racketeering activity" means unlawful gambling activ-
ity and the act or threat of any other criminal offense
(which expression, for the avoidance of doubt, does not
include any offense which relates directly or indirectly to
the regulation including the imposition, calculation or
collection of any tax) listed in this Article;
(C) "Pattern of racketeering activity" means at least two
acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred
within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment)
after the commission of a prior act of racketeering
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activity;
(D) "Unlawful debt" means a debt"
(1) incurred or contracted in unlawful gambling activity
or which is unenforceable in law in whole or in part as
to principal or interest because of laws relating to
usury; and
(2) which was incurred in connection with the business of
gambling in violation of the law or the business of
lending money or a thing of value at a rate usurious
under law, where the usurious rate is at least twice the
enforceable rate; and
(E) "Enterprise" includes any individual partnership, corpo-
ration, association, or other legal entity, and any union
or group of individuals associated in fact although not a
legal entity;
(c) "Narcotics trafficking" which means all offenses or ancillary
civil or administrative proceedings taken by either of the Par-
ties or their agencies connected with, arising from, related to,
or resulting from any narcotics activity covered by the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, or the Protocol Amend-
ing the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, or any
other international agreements or arrangements binding upon
both the Parties;
(d) Willfully or dishonestly obtaining money, property or valuable
securities from other persons by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses or statements, whether oral or written, regarding or
affecting benefits available in connection with the laws and
regulations relating to income or other taxes;
(e) Willfully or dishonestly making false statements whether oral
or written, to government tax authorities (e.g., willfully or dis-
honestly submitting a false income tax return) with respect to
any tax matter arising from the unlawful proceeds of any
criminal offense covered by any other provision of this defini-
tion, except sub-paragraph (f), or willfully or dishonestly fail-
ing to make a report to government tax authorities as required
by law in respect of, or to pay the tax due on, any such unlaw-
ful proceeds;
(f) Willfully or dishonestly failing to make to the Government a
report which is required by law to be made to it in respect of
an international transfer of currency or other financial trans-
actions connected with, arising from or related to the unlawful
proceeds of any criminal offense falling within any provision of
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this Article, except this sub-paragraph or sub-paragraph (e)
above;
(g) "Insider trading" which means the offer, purchase, or sale of
securities by any person while in possession of material non-
public information directly or indirectly relating to the securi-
ties offered, purchased, or sold, in breach of a legally binding
duty of trust or confidence;
(h) Fraudulent securities practices, which means the use by any
person willfully or dishonestly of any means, directly or indi-
rectly, in connection with the offer, purchase or sale of any
security;
(i) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(ii) dishonestly to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statement made, in light of the circumstances
under which it was made, not misleading; or
(iii) dishonestly to engage in any act, practice, or course of bus-
iness which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person;
(i) "Foreign corrupt practices" which means the corrupt offering,
paying, or making of inducements by any person to any for-
eign official or foreign political party, official thereof or candi-
date for foreign official office in order to assist such person in
obtaining or retaining business for himself or in directing bus-
iness to any other person;
Uj) Any of the above defined criminal offenses, where United
States federal jurisdiction is based upon interstate transport,
use of the mails, telecommunications or other interstate
facilities;
(k) Such further offenses as may from time to time be agreed
upon by exchange of diplomatic notes between the United
States and the United Kingdom, including the Cayman Is-
lands; and
(1) Any attempt or conspiracy to commit, or participation as ac-
cessory after the fact to, any of the above defined criminal
offenses.
ARTICLE 20
Ratification, Entry Into Force, and Termination
1. This Treaty shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratifica-
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tion shall be exchanged at Washington as soon as possible.
2. This Treaty shall enter into force upon the exchange of instru-
ments of ratification.
3. The Government of either the United States or the United
Kingdom, including the Cayman Islands, may terminate this Treaty by
giving three months' notice in writing to the other Government at any
time.

